Machiavelli’s [amazon_link id=”0140449159″ target=”_blank” ]The Prince[/amazon_link] has a new rival. It’s The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics by Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, to be published in October. Public spirit has no place in politics for these two eminent political scientists: “Our starting point is that any leader worth her salt wants as much power as she can get, and to keep it for as long as possible.” There is no clear distinction between dictators and democrats, they argue, only a difference of degree. And that is the size of the coalition on which they rely to stay in power.

The authors categorize the population of any entity – nation state, city, corporation, university – into three groups: all those who have a nominal say in selecting a leader (the whole adult population in both the UK and North Korea); those whose vote actually counts (the whole adult population in a democracy but only Communist Party members in China); and the minimum coalition needed to win the vote in this latter group (‘the essentials’). The key determinant of the form of governance is the size of these groups. And the key political task of the leader is to reward the essentials enough to keep them loyal. This is why democratic governments spend on public goods: it is too expensive to give private rewards to a large electorate. But dictators will reward their supporters directly, and never mind the people.

This obviously seems a highly cynical analysis, and after finishing the book it hadn’t changed my view that democratic politicians are usually motivated by genuinely high motives as well as low politics. However, the book does a good job of demonstrating how well the three-dimensional framework explains governance and outcomes in a wide range of organisations. Just think about executive pay and banking bonuses for example. Individual shareholders are nominal owners but have no real influence. Big shareholders have some say over boardroom decisions. But the real power lies with just a handful of board members. Surprise, surprise, CEOs keep them sweet with rocketing pay and bonuses. Another neat example is provided by the IOC and FIFA. An IOC vote on the location of the Olympics depends on just 58 votes (a winning number out of the 115 person body); FIFA decisions on just 13. The book notes estimates that buying an IOC vote costs about $100,000-200,000, and a FIFA vote $800,000.

The authors draw some firm conclusions from their analysis. For example, aid donors should never give money, or forgive debts, in advance of democratization; it will only go straight into the bank accounts or pet projects of the corrupt few. Comparing countries similar in key ways – income per capita, geography, culture, size – they show convincingly that the democrats spend on public goods but the dictators spend on their cronies. This conclusion obviously ties in with an increasingly prominent theme in the development economics literature.

Less persuasive is the book’s argument that sooner or later every society will get to a point where the number of essential supporters becomes large enough to move its governance from the dictatorship towards the democracy end of the spectrum. It doesn’t set out these dynamics clearly, although sometimes a disastrous economy which is becoming too poor to plunder can be the trigger for reform. Change depends on increasing the number of ‘essentials’. To continue with the IOC example, the authors’ suggestion for reform is that all former Olympic athletes should be allowed to vote on decisions about future games. That would obviously make a huge difference – but how is the IOC to be persuaded to do so?

There is an intriguing hint that new technologies – much hyped for their part in the Arab Spring – could make a big difference. The book dismisses the formality of elections as a democratic tool, because they are so easy to rig. More important is free speech and assembly. I would have liked to see the later chapters explore in more detail how the process works, and why Twitter revolutions have succeeded in some polities but not others.

However, wanting more rather than less of a book is a good sign. This is a fantastically thought-provoking read. I found myself not wanting to agree but actually, for the most part, being convinced that the cynical analysis is the true one.