Michael Sandel came to popular attention in the UK, at least as far as Radio 4 counts as popular, as the latest Reith Lecturer (and what other broadcaster in the world would host an annual lecture series of this kind?) He used the lectures to attack market ideology – this was deep in the financial crisis – and although I disagreed with much of what he said in detail, he's one of the few people to articulate so thoughtfully the way market philosophy might actually change behaviour for the worse. (Donald Mackenzie is another to do so – being a sociologist he refers to it as 'performativity'.)

Duly interested and provoked, I bought Sandel's new book Justice, drawn from his Harvard lectures, which are now available online, in a fantastic step by the university.

It's certainly the most readable philosophy book I've ever read, in fact a page-turner at points. He covers the three fundamental approaches to ethical decision making – utility, freedom and virtue – and tests them by applying each lens to practical questions. It's a terrific process for testing one's own beliefs and their consistency or lack of it. Sandel is in the virtue camp, a lineage dating to Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. In other words, he concludes that questions of morality and fairness stem ultimately from a basic set of values, which are located in a specific social and historical context.

Sandel's Justice should be read along with Sen's The Idea of Justice – reviewed here earlier. Sen is in the freedom camp, with freedom given practical meaning by an emphasis on the capabilities individuals have to exercise it. The utilitarian camp is strongly represented by the happiness advocates, people like Richard Layard and Robert Frank.

Sandel doesn't persuade me fully. Although looking at the wreckage of the financial landscape and the policy response to it, one does want to insist on the importance of civic virtues as opposed to an undiluted reliance on the operation of markets, I don't want to take the reliance on values too far. There have been great gains in social welfare from the increasing emphasis on freedom and rights during the past 50 years. Giving too much of a role to virtues in society is a recipe for conformity and ultimately repression. And while I find utilitarianism hugely flawed, with its own tendencies to paternalism, or repression, it is a great lens for public choice in many contexts – in fact in precisely the context of decision-making at the margin.

As a non-philosopher, one naturally wants to pick and choose from these philosophical frameworks depending on the context – as is increasingly apparent, we have strong instincts about what is moral or just, David Hume's and Adam Smith's 'moral sentiments' having a basis in biology. Steven Pinker has written wonderfully accessibly about moral instincts. Perhaps there's an impossibility theorem in ethics more broadly than the formalities of social welfare theory? Perhaps it is appropriate to apply a different framework in different contexts? At least I'm now aware of my philosophical inconsistencies.

Meanwhile I'll pass the book on to my eldest son, who has just started philosophy at university. He can apply the remorseless logic of the young and tell me what I should think.