At last some serious scholarly attention is being paid to the role China is playing in the economies of Africa, getting past the cliches and myths. The Dragon's Gift: The real story of China in Africa by Deborah Brautigam is a detailed, thorough assessment of China's engagement around the continent and the impact of its investments and aid. It should be essential reading for anybody in the western aid community as well as other academics.
One of the key insights is that China's policies draw on their own recent experience as a recipient of aid and as a developing country. Chinese policymakers believe that their relationships with African governments can bring mutual benefits, an exchange of economic progress for natural resources, because that has been China's path. Their own economy has moved along a track from shipping coal and minerals abroad to basic manufacturing to higher value activities. With China's help and investment, they believe African economies can follow the same path. This is one reason so much of China's investment involves infrastructure projects. As a result, they see aid as a small part of a menu of means of engagement, extending through concessional loans to direct investment. All of these are aligned to the same mutually beneficial end. China's engagement in Africa is a strategic one, not an opportunistic resource-grab – at least in intention it is not remotely like the western colonial engagement with Africa.
Another lesson for me was the duration of China's relationships. It has been an aid donor and investor on a large scale since the 1970s. It's just that many of us have only noticed China in Africa recently. Between 1967 and 1976, aid accounted for 5% of Chinese government expenditure (although a large proportion of this went to Vietnam). (p41) But as long ago as 1984 China was the 8th largest donor in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to the OECD's DAC. (p54)
In addition to emphasising infrastructure, China has a heritage philosophy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and – perhaps notoriously – is therefore less likely to impose conditions on its projects. Brautigam explains exceptions to this as linked to individual African countries' attitudes to Taiwan. She also points out that China is clear African economies need to industrialise to develop – whereas “an increase in manufacturing is not part of the Millennium Development Goals.” (p191) I think the Chinese are right; for all the negative aspects of early-stage industrialisation, African countries need to go through it.
The question is whether Chinese investment can help create a self-sustaining industrial base in Africa. There are many examples where Chinese investors have found, just like their western counterparts, that factories and facilities left to Africans to run founder in corruption and ineptitude. The book gives many examples of projects where the Chinese have built the plant, trained the managers, left it to run – and had to return later to rescue it with Chinese supervisors once again. The next few years will reveal whether that is changing in any African countries – the outlook seems variable.
The Dragon's Gift is a sign that received western wisdom about China's role – that it's merely cynical and exploitative – is being challenged. Peter Gill's Famine and Foreigners also took a more informed and nuanced perspective on China in Africa. Brautigam cites a debate on the Zambian Economist blog about a 2008 Newsnight report that raised the same question. I haven't yet watched the recent BBC documentary, The Chinese are Coming, on the same subject. However, The Dragon's Gift is by far the most thorough look at this subject so far. Parts of it are very detailed but the author flags them up for readers. Highly recommended for anyone interested in this subject.
