I’ll collate the economic history suggestions another time. Meanwhile, though, seeing a recommendation for David Edgerton‘s influential [amazon_link id=”1861973063″ target=”_blank” ]The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900[/amazon_link] sent me to both that – which insists that there is too much cheerleading about invention and not enough focus on the implementation of technologies in specific historical contexts – and to his subsequent book, [amazon_link id=”0141026103″ target=”_blank” ]Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War[/amazon_link].

The latter makes some contrarian arguments about the war. Edgerton argues that (a) Britain was the richest and most powerful combatant thanks to its imperial resources – it is a mistake to think of it as a beleagured nation standing alone begging for American charity, and Germany would (and did) struggle to combat it; and (b) the ‘declinist’ histories about Britain after the war (notably Corelli Barnett in [amazon_link id=”033034790X” target=”_blank” ]The Audit of War[/amazon_link] and  [amazon_link id=”0333480457″ target=”_blank” ]The Lost Victory [/amazon_link]etc) are mistaken, as relative decline was due largely to strong growth in other countries.

[amazon_image id=”0141026103″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War[/amazon_image]

Edgerton’s argument is pinned on a materialist account of the resources and technology developed and used by Britain. Some of this evidence is very striking. One example is a graphic showing the vastly, vastly greater tonnage of bombs the UK dropped on Germany compared with German bombing of the UK – the horrors of the firestorms and mythology of the Blitz notwithstanding. It’s all very interesting. Britain’s early defeats led to a huge emphasis on increasing production, he writes, saying there was a “powerful sense that the war was a war of production,” with contemporary debate focusing on industrial efficiency, or the lack of it.

The importance of scientific advance in the conflict is obviously a well-known part of the story, from codebreaking (my favourite account is R.V Jones’s [amazon_link id=”185326699X” target=”_blank” ]Most Secret War)[/amazon_link] to the Manhattan Project. Edgerton adds to this the sense of Imperial power and the availability of material resources.

[amazon_image id=”185326699X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Most Secret War (Wordsworth Military Library)[/amazon_image]

His reinterpretation is certainly interesting, and it must always be fruitful to test received wisdom. His claim that postwar decline is misinterpreted is less convincing, however. Surely the loss of Empire is a decline, whether you think it was a good thing or not? And the transition to US superpowerdom postwar is clear.

I see from his website that Prof Edgerton is working on currently working on Capitalism, Empire and Nation: a new history of twentieth-century Britain, a forthcoming book for Penguin. That will be an essential read.