Tag Archives: economics

Economics and evolutionary science

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I recommend this Evonomics post about economics post-2008, and the kind of re-evaluation that’s been going on among economists, citing somewhat critically Noah Smith and also Dani Rodrik’s excellent [amazon_link id=”0393246418″ target=”_blank” ]Economics Rules[/amazon_link]. Author David Sloan Wilson complains: “All good, but there is something missing from the internet links that I just provided—any discussion of evolutionary theory.”

[amazon_image id=”0393246418″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Economics Rules: The Rights and Wrongs of the Dismal Science[/amazon_image]

I couldn’t resist preening a little, for my 2007/2010 book [amazon_link id=”B004XCFI2Q” target=”_blank” ]The Soulful Science: What Economists Really Do and Why It Matters[/amazon_link], has a whole chapter, Murderous Apes and Entrepreneurs, about the importance of the links between economics and evolutionary biology. This also forms one strand of my 2012 Tanner Lectures. In other words, I wholly agree with the argument of the Evonomics post, but thhink there has been a little bit more progress than it acknowledges.

Of course, formal evolutionary theorising is not part of the conventional economics mainstream, although it has some distinguished practitioners; but having said that informally it widely informs much business economics. There are also some leading economists who have been thinking about the overlap between economics and evolution. The ‘murderous apes’ of the chapter title was inspired by Paul Seabright’s brilliant [amazon_link id=”0691146462″ target=”_blank” ]The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life[/amazon_link]; Wilson cites Robert Frank’s [amazon_link id=”0691156689″ target=”_blank” ]The Darwin Economy[/amazon_link]. There is also an active strand of research on complexity theory, which [amazon_link id=”0571197264″ target=”_blank” ]Paul Ormerod[/amazon_link] and [amazon_link id=”0415568552″ target=”_blank” ]Alan Kirman[/amazon_link] among others have written about.

[amazon_image id=”B004XCFI2Q” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Soulful Science: What Economists Really Do and Why It Matters[/amazon_image] [amazon_image id=”0691146462″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life[/amazon_image] [amazon_image id=”B008W4ASGC” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Darwin Economy: Liberty, Competition, and the Common Good[/amazon_image]

Economics will have to be consistent with what we learn about human behaviour and decisions from other human sciences, not just the other social sciences, but also evolutionary biology, cognitive science and psychology.

Non-rational economic man

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This past couple of days I’ve been attending the IDEI/Toulouse School of Economics digital economics conference, where the Suzanne Scotchmer Memorial Lecture was given by Joshua Gans.

Josh has a new book out soon (March), definitely one to look forward to, The Disruption Dilemma. The blurb says: “Almost twenty years ago Clayton Christensen popularized the term in his book [amazon_link id=”142219602X” target=”_blank” ]The Innovator’s Dilemma[/amazon_link], writing of disruption as a set of risks that established firms face. Since then, few have closely examined his account. Gans does so in this book. He looks at companies that have proven resilient and those that have fallen, and explains why some companies have successfully managed disruption — Fujifilm and Canon, for example — and why some like Blockbuster and Encyclopedia Britannica have not. Departing from the conventional wisdom, Gans identifies two kinds of disruption: demand-side, when successful firms focus on their main customers and underestimate market entrants with innovations that target niche demands; and supply-side, when firms focused on developing existing competencies become incapable of developing new ones.”

[amazon_image id=”0262034484″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Disruption Dilemma[/amazon_image]

However, his lecture was on his paper on the market for scholarly attribution, which interprets the assignment of co-authorship between senior and junior scientific researchers in terms of a signalling model. It was very interesting and perhaps sheds some light on the growing trend toward larger numbers of co-authors on science papers. The day afterwards, Justin Wolfers wrote in the New York Times about a new paper by Heather Sarsons showing among other results that women get zero credit for papers on which they are listed by co-authors (unless the others are also women). While this is a finding that will not surprise any female academics, it’s also kind of shocking to see the empirical results so starkly. No doubt Josh will blog about the gap between the rational world of his model and the non-rationality of male economists.

The rhetoric of economics, ctd.

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From [amazon_link id=”0521094461″ target=”_blank” ]Theoretical Welfare Economics[/amazon_link] by J De V Graaff: “On the one hand, it could be argued that the term ‘real national income’ is a mere definition, devoid of normative significance. … On the other hand, it could be objected that ‘the real national income’ is an emotive expression; and to say it has increased in to imply that the state of affairs thus described is approved or is in some sense thought to be good or desirable.”

He argues – and I wholeheartedly agree – that we should use the terminology as people normally understand it, with its normative connotation, and not like economists insisting that all that [amazon_link id=”0691169853″ target=”_blank” ]GDP[/amazon_link] measures is what it is defined to include.

[amazon_image id=”0521094461″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Theoretical Welfare Economics[/amazon_image]

Thinking about welfare economics – or not

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I’ve been reading I.M.D.Little’s [amazon_link id=”0198281196″ target=”_blank” ]Critique of Welfare Economics[/amazon_link] (1950 originally – I have Andrew Sentance’s slight musty, rescued from his garage, 1973 paperback). He wrote: “There can be no significance in national-income comparisons unless a value judgement about changes in distribution is presupposed. But statisticians … do not, of course, wish to make any such presupposition.” He continues that they can tell us that the market value of consumption goods has increased, but cannot conclude that consumption has increased. “There is, after all, no such thing as consumption, the size of which can be measured.”

[amazon_image id=”0198281196″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]A Critique of Welfare Economics[/amazon_image]

Winging its way to me now, courtesy of a recommendation by Martin Wolf, is [amazon_link id=”0521094461″ target=”_blank” ]Theoretical Welfare Economics[/amazon_link] by J de V Graaff (1957), which one contemporary review described as “an elegantly executed demolition of ordinary welfare theory.” I don’t need a lot of persuading about the demolition-worthiness of the theory but it does leave rather a huge question about (a) what we think we’re measuring with the national accounts and (b) what we think standard evaluations of public policy are telling us. The answer, of course, is that mostly we don’t think about it.

[amazon_image id=”0521094461″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Theoretical Welfare Economics[/amazon_image]

People and economists

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There’s a chapter online from a forthcoming book, Economic Psychology edited by Robert Ranyard, called How Laypeople Understand Economics, by David Leiser and Zeev Krill. Although not entirely surprising, the chapter is very interesting. Those of us who are economists long ago internalised the subject’s distinctive way of thinking and understanding of how variables are related. Most people find economics difficult, even mysterious, however. There are some excellent demystifications, from John Lanchester’s [amazon_link id=”039335170X” target=”_blank” ]How to Speak Money[/amazon_link] to Tim Harford’s [amazon_link id=”0349119856″ target=”_blank” ]Undercover Economist[/amazon_link], and all the rest of the popular economics literature. But as this chapter points out, laypeople – including many politicians – will use one of three strategies for trying to make sense of economic discussions: use heuristics; use metaphors; fall back on teleological or causal explanations.

One example of a common heuristic is ‘good begets good’ – if there is a change in one variable perceived to be good, it is assumed it will cause good changes in other variables. On metaphors, the authors comment: “Understanding of financial marketsrelies onseven metaphors: the market as a bazaar, as a machine, as gambling, as sports, as war, as a living being and as an ocean. Crucially, each metaphor highlights and hides from view certain aspects of the foreign exchange market. Some of themetaphors imply market predictability, others do not. For instance, the sports and themachine metaphors were found to be associated with fixed rules and predictability, whereas the bazaar and war metaphors with unpredictability.”

[amazon_image id=”039335170X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]How to Speak Money: What the Money People Say-And What It Really Means[/amazon_image]  [amazon_image id=”0349119856″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Undercover Economist[/amazon_image]