Historicism and its enemies

By the time I had to head back to the station yesterday, I’d almost finished reading the manuscript I’m reviewing, so I borrowed Karl Popper’s [amazon_link id=”0415278465″ target=”_blank” ]The Poverty of Historicism[/amazon_link] from the shelves of my University of Manchester office mate John Salter (as he teaches political economy, and theories of justice, he has a fine and tempting collection of classics).

I’m not very far into it yet, but it’s striking that Popper excludes economics from his pronouncements about methodology in the social sciences. Eg, “I am convinced that such historicist doctrines of method are at bottom responsible for the unsatisfactory state of the theoretical social sciences (other than economic theory).” No doubt all will be revealed, but it’s surprising to read this at a time when economics is widely criticised.

[amazon_image id=”0415065690″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Poverty of Historicism[/amazon_image]

Impossibility and elections

I’ve now read a few more of the essays in [amazon_link id=”1137383585″ target=”_blank” ]Economics for the Curious[/amazon_link], the collection of essays for young economists by the Lindau lecturers. Eric Maskin’s chapter, How Should We Elect Our Leaders, is the most accessible explanation I’ve read of Arrow’s Impossibility theorem in the context of elections, and is particularly interesting reading for anybody in the UK as we face the likelihood of an election outcome even more hung in 2015 than it was in 2010.

[amazon_image id=”1137383585″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Economics for the Curious: Inside the Minds of 12 Nobel Laureates[/amazon_image]

The chapter describes Maskin’s work with Partha Dasgupta looking at what voting system best satisfies the other Arrow conditions when the ‘unrestricted domain’ condition is removed by taking account of the fact that voters’ preferences are limited in plausible ways – for example, a left-wing voter will prefer candidates of the left to any candidates of the right. (Sen of course long ago identified the unrestricted domain condition as the least necessary of the Arrow conditions.) In this case, Maskin and Dasgupta prove that majority voting is clearly the best system.

As Maskin concludes here: “Majority rule is used by virtually every democratic legislature in the world for enacting laws. … It is interesting that there is a precise way in which majority rule does a better job than every other electoral method in embodying what we want out of a voting system. So, perhaps the next time your legislature votes in favour of an absurd law,, you can take consolation from the fact that … they at least used the correct method for voting!”

Guest post on the (changing) state of economics

Bringing About Debate and Change in Economics.

By Peter Smith

The financial crisis has raised serious questions about the validity of mainstream economics and whether it addresses some important aspects of reality. This does suggest that at least some radical changes are needed in the core economic models of ‘how the world really is’. I’d like to suggest that outsiders can have a useful role when change of such a radical kind is needed; at the very least, we may have tools and approaches that economists are not familiar with. History is on my side here: some of Thomas Kuhn’s famous paradigm shifts described in his [amazon_link id=”0226458121″ target=”_blank” ]Structure of Scientific Revolutions[/amazon_link] arose from just this sort of cross-fertilization.

[amazon_image id=”0226458121″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition[/amazon_image]

Getting a productive debate going may not be so easy, however, given the mutual suspicion and hostility between (some) external critics and (some) mainstream economists. The latter have perpetrated some appalling examples of arrogance. Lionel Robbins, in [amazon_link id=”0333370392″ target=”_blank” ]the essay[/amazon_link] that defined (mainstream) economics, claimed it was: “A body of generalizations whose substantial accuracy are open to question only by the ignorant or the perverse.” Much more recently, Robert Skidelsky’s description of economics as ‘a branch of logic’ shows that this tradition of disdain for critics is alive and kicking. (Skidelsky seems to hold the mistaken belief that you cannot arrive at erroneous conclusions using logic.)

In the opposite direction, though, external critics perceive a theme (about the need to reduce the size and role of the state) that runs from undergraduate textbooks and teaching, right through to the formulation of public policy. It appears to unify the discipline and all its members around a body of theory that provides politically-convenient support for laissez-faire – despite having a number of serious flaws that have persisted, un-mended, for many decades (such as the lack of any realistic model of how buyers and sellers get to know the ‘true’ price). What is really going on here?

Our critical instinct is to go into even the earliest stages of contact with academic economists eager to trash this set of ideas – totally missing the point that not all economists are tarred with the same brush. If we, the external critics, imply that all economists are engaged in a conspiracy to suppress our criticism, we brand ourselves as ignorant, and thereby lose potential allies within the profession. (I’m using ‘we’ because my home discipline is management – not sure quite where I belong now.)

In reality, there are many senior academics who have long held deep reservations about the power of markets to optimise anything, and do not subscribe to the old easy certainties about laissez-faire. (Curiously, [amazon_link id=”1907994041″ target=”_blank” ]these reservations[/amazon_link] are almost entirely absent from undergraduate teaching and textbooks.) The profession is still deeply-divided, though, and other eminent academics do still adhere to the old certainties. In an article in The Economist, Robert Lucas claimed that the post-2007 crisis should not be taken as evidence of deep-seated flaws in mainstream economics, because the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) showed that such crises were inherently unforeseeable – this despite the considerable body of evidence against the EMH. (There is a summary of this in Robert Shiller’s [amazon_link id=”0691166269″ target=”_blank” ]Irrational Exuberance[/amazon_link].) At the very least, we are able to see when we are entering a period of great potential instability – the case studies of earlier crises in Paul Krugman’s [amazon_link id=”1846142393″ target=”_blank” ]Return of Depression Economics[/amazon_link] identify some interesting indicators.

[amazon_image id=”0691166269″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Irrational Exuberance[/amazon_image]   [amazon_image id=”1846142393″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Return of Depression Economics[/amazon_image]

The profession also includes those who studied economics, years or decades back. They were taught that (mainstream) economics is indeed ‘a body of generalizations whose substantial accuracy are open to question only by the ignorant or the perverse’. A lot of my old colleagues in the major international development organizations belong to this group. With few exceptions, they certainly subscribe to the belief that mainstream economics has got it just about right – as do many economic commentators, notably The Times columnist, Daniel Finkelstein. I am thinking particularly of his encomium (14th Dec 2014) on the late Gary Becker. (Becker was probably the most over-confident advocate of extending mainstream economic principles to cover much of human non-market behaviour.)

Finally, there are politicians who want to use the simple messages about the beneficence of market forces to promote an agenda of ‘rolling back the state’ – some from sincere conviction, some in cynical pursuit of personal or factional interests.

Mainstream economics isn’t a single, monolithic body of experts and expertise. Rather than attacking this mirage, we all – meaning internal and external critics alike – should be thinking about a radical review of the mainstream paradigm, and seeking more realistic alternatives. (One thing that my particular school of outsiders can contribute is skills and approaches for managing that process.) That, however, is a much bigger story, one for another day.

Peter blogs as EconomicsEye. Since starting out in the natural sciences, he has worked in project management, and the management of R&D and innovation.

Economics for the curious

Each August there’s a meeting in Lindau of economics (and other) Nobel laureates.* I’ve never attended but have just been looking at the book of essays for young economists written by the participants in the conference, [amazon_link id=”1137383585″ target=”_blank” ]Economics for the Curious[/amazon_link] edited by Robert Solow with Janice Murray. There’s an obviously impressive list of contributors, whose talks cover subjects ranging from natural resource sustainability (Robert Solow) to structural change in the global economy (Mike Spence, who taught me a graduate micro course once upon a time) to the role of transactions costs in the social sciences (Oliver Williamson) and the character of economics (Vernon Smith).

[amazon_image id=”1137383585″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Economics for the Curious: Inside the Minds of 12 Nobel Laureates[/amazon_image]

The essays (the ones I’ve read) are very accessible and non-technical. Solow’s essay on applying economic principles to renewable and non-renewable resources is a model of clarity that could be set for undergraduates. Williamson’s essay on transactions cost economics is fascinating. He insists on the importance of interdisciplinarity – I hadn’t known he started out an engineer and came to economics via business. He usefully describes Coase’s famous 1960 paper, The Problem of Social Cost (pdf), the origin of modern institutional economics, as an exercise in reductio ad absurdum – what happens when you push the logic of zero transactions costs to its conclusion? He usefully captures Coase’s stricture against ‘blackboard economics’ by explaining the need for comparing any activity being analysed, not to an abstract ideal of efficiency, but to a realistic alternative. He ends with advice to students to take elective courses in any filed that interests them. “Try it. You may like it.”

I’ll now finish reading the essays, but my impression is that it’s a little book which is perfectly pitched for undergraduates or sixth formers, and is currently only just over £10 on Amazon.

 

 

 

* I know it isn’t a ‘real’ Nobel, ok?

What do economists know?

Emran Mian, who runs the Social Market Foundation (and has written a brilliant novel, [amazon_link id=”1846556260″ target=”_blank” ]The Banker’s Daughter[/amazon_link]), has a terrific essay – Prediction and the Flagpole –  in 3am Magazine about the problem of knowledge in economics – what do we actually know about how the economy works, about causality? As he points out, either the mechanisms are highly contested among economists, or ignored by them. We don’t know very much at all.

There should be no shame in this, because we don’t know much about anything. This is why epistemology is so hard. However, as the article also says, “We live in a peculiarly economics-friendly public sphere.” Yet many economists over-claim their knowledge, especially when it comes to making predictions. Personally, I think economic forecasting is largely a hopeless task except for the limited task of using time series methods to predict a short period ahead. (I was a forecaster for several years, a long time ago, so I know whereof I speak.) Chris Dillow has recently blogged about the nonsense often associated with forecasts – unicorn farming is his term for it. Nate Silver’s [amazon_link id=”0141975652″ target=”_blank” ]The Signal and the Noise[/amazon_link] has a terrific chapter effectively demolishing most macroeconomic forecasts.

After the onset of the financial crisis, there were lots of calls for economists to be humbler. I don’t see a lot of humility, alas. Most f my colleagues have little interest in the philosophical questions, although of course my great hero David Hume was keen on epistemology. One terrific book about what economists can know is John Sutton’s [amazon_link id=”0262692791″ target=”_blank” ]Marshall’s Tendencies: What Can Economists Know?[/amazon_link]. I must read Mary Morgan’s [amazon_link id=”0521176190″ target=”_blank” ]The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think[/amazon_link], and Nancy Cartwright’s recent [amazon_link id=”0199841624″ target=”_blank” ]Evidence-Based Policy[/amazon_link] – she has also written a lot about the causality question.

[amazon_image id=”0262692791″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Marshall’s Tendencies: What Can Economists Know? (Eyskens Lecture) (Gaston Eyskens Lectures)[/amazon_image]  [amazon_image id=”0521176190″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think[/amazon_image]  [amazon_image id=”0199841624″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Evidence-Based Policy: A Practical Guide to Doing It Better[/amazon_image]