Bernanke, banks and bugs

The dreaded flu going around has struck me, so I’ve been paging through a book it’s easy to hold while lying in bed feeling wan. It’s [amazon_link id=”0691158738″ target=”_blank” ]The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis[/amazon_link], some lectures given by Ben Bernanke at George Washington University last year.

[amazon_image id=”0691158738″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis[/amazon_image]

I won’t pretend to be alert enough to have absorbed every nuance, but the Fed Chairman’s overall message is clear: of course we might have got some details wrong but we did exactly what it says on the Fed tin in acting as a lender of last resort to the financial system and calming the panic. What’s more, if you look over the long span of history (he being the author of [amazon_link id=”0691118205″ target=”_blank” ]Essays on the Great Depression[/amazon_link]), the loss of output subsequent to the crisis is clear but the US economy will sooner or later get back on its long term growth trend.

[amazon_image id=”0691118205″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Essays on the Great Depression[/amazon_image]

No doubt it’s the combined effect of the bugs wreaking havoc on my well-being and the peculiarly horrible medicine I’ve been taking, but I’m much less sure the crisis is fixed. I’m not confident the same kind of crisis could not occur again tomorrow – the banks are still too big, too intertwined, too leveraged with – as Admati and Hellwig point out in their superb new book, [amazon_link id=”0691156840″ target=”_blank” ]The Bankers’ New Clothes[/amazon_link] – far too little equity capital. At any rate, I don’t want to rely entirely on the forces of history. I think the Fed has indeed done a decent job in the face of the imminent 2008 meltdown; but in making the comparison with the Fed’s historical role as lender of last resort, the lectures lack a sense of the really fundamental questions about the present financial system.

[amazon_image id=”0691156840″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It[/amazon_image]

A book that will change your mind

As an author, I’ve learned that most readers take out of a book what they bring to it. We all have our pre-existing worldview and it is rare for us to alter it. So I was struck by this comment by Ian Bright on a book I reviewed here last month, [amazon_link id=”0691158681″ target=”_blank” ]The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy[/amazon_link] by Michael Pettis. Ian writes: “I have now read Pettis book. It is as good (even better) than you outlined….. the book challenges much of the way I think about things.”

[amazon_image id=”0691158681″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy[/amazon_image]

As his comment notes, the recent FT review of the book was somewhat unfair. It says the author ignores the importance of history, and gives the impression that this weakens the argument. I don’t agree. Anyway, it addresses the overall pattern of global imbalances so it would be a monster task to embed that in an informative history of the world’s major trading blocs.

If you are interested in the global economy and believe yourself to have an open mind, I urge you to read it. It’s ideal for students too because it sets out so clearly the operation of the accounting identities of the balance of payments.

Adrift in theory and history

A new book has flown through the letter box and landed, squawking gently to attract attention, on my desk this afternoon. I’m distracted enough from my work to page through it, and am jolted alert by the title of the concluding chapter: “Using Theory to Learn from History.” That’s exactly what economists presuming to give policy advice ought to do.

The theory in [amazon_link id=”069115743X” target=”_blank” ]The Leaderless Economy[/amazon_link] by Peter Temin and David Vines is the theory of internal and external balance in international economics. The history is the Great Depression – “The economic problems of the 1930s only became known as the Great Depression after the fact. Politicians and economists struggled to understand what was happening in real time.”

The real time choices political leaders around the world make now will have large and lasting effects. Will theory and history help them avert Great Depression 2.0? My quick scan of the book suggests the authors are not optimistic. Back to work.

[amazon_image id=”069115743X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Leaderless Economy: Why the World Economic System Fell Apart and How to Fix It[/amazon_image]

Bankers, exposed

I’ve thoroughly enjoyed reading [amazon_link id=”0691156840″ target=”_blank” ]The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to do About It[/amazon_link] by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig. The title refers to the fairy tale about the naked emperor whom his citizens believe to be clothed in splendid robes until one child, immune from the groupthink, points out his nudity. This book’s aim, decisively achieved, is to de-mistify the public conversation about banking so we can all understand how threadbare the industry is.

The first part of the book gives a careful explanation of leverage and the role of bank equity. While the examples seem simplistic to start with, it is a useful stepping stone to evaluating the current regulatory debate about banks’ equity ratios. The logic is straightforward: the higher banks’ equity, the less destabilising is the effect of leverage, and the less the scope for contagion between banks in a crisis. The authors explain why in 2008 contagion spread so quickly around the financial system, with the arrival of money market funds and increased globalisation also playing a role. They also argue that bankers became complacent because they believed their own quantitative risk models, foolishly.

Importantly, the book also convincingly debunks the banks’ argument that there is no need for them to increase the amount of equity they hold. As Admati and Hellwig note, we suffer from a lack of clarity of thought about this subject. They describe statements made by the industry – with examples – as “nonsensical and false”. Bankers misuse the word ‘capital’ or ‘equity’ to confuse us, the book says. Bank lobbyists say equity is expensive, and increasing the amount they need to hold will therefore reduce the amount they can lend, or raise the cost of lending. They obfuscate the fact that higher equity requirements are equivalent to a limit on the proportion of a bank’s funding that can come from borrowing or leverage. Excess leverage was precisely the reason for the gravity of the financial crisis.

“The confusion about the term bank capital is pervasive… This confusion is insidious because it biases the debate, suggesting costs and trade-offs that do not actually exist….Viable banks can increase their reliance on unborrowed funds without any reduction in lending.”

It is only non-viable banks that would be constrained in their activity.

Their return on equity in fact depends on the risks the banks are taking – as we have seen, low equity ratios pre-crisis did not result in high returns on equity. The return on equity isn’t fixed, and doesn’t have a simple inverse relationship with the amount of equity held. The ROE will depend on the debt-equity mix, among other things.

Suppose, anyway, that the cost of making loans, and therefore interest rates paid by borrowers, were to increase if banks had to hold more equity. That would be a good thing if the rates paid reflected the risks incurred more accurately. It is pretty clear that risk was under-priced before the crisis, and people borrowed too much compared to the likelihood they could repay the loan. A number of very senior bankers acknowledged as much in a conference I attended at the end of last week.

What’s more, why should banks be different from other businesses? Apple has no debt, but its 100% equity ratio does not appear to have harmed its returns. When one would consider, say, 30% equity low for another kind of business, why on earth do we accept that 3% is the ballpark for banks? Should banks not hold higher levels of equity than the rest of the business sector, to reflect the socialisation of the risks they take, and the subsidies they receive via deposit guarantees?

The middle section of the book walks through the arguments for significantly higher bank equity ratios. The final section then turns to the politics of bank regulation. As the authors note, there is a chasm between talk and action, in every country. One reason bank lobbying succeeds is that politicians believe they need to back their own nation’s banks – or at least not disadvantage them – in global competition. Thus, although French politicians talk tough about banking and financial markets, they have been least supportive of moves to tighten bank regulation including equity ratios. Yet when banks succeed in the race for global market share, it is because they are being subsidised by their taxpayers and imposing large risks on them. This is the tyranny of the idea of a ‘level playing field’.

Some regulators understand this. The Bank of England’s Andrew Haldane has argued for higher equity ratios, among other requirements – albeit in the context of a discussion of 4% rather than 3% of the total balance sheet, so still pitifully low in the eyes of The Bankers’ New Clothes. He also persuasively argues that banks should focus on return on their assets (ie. how good a job do they do of lending money for productive activities that pay a good return?) rather than the current industry obsession with return on equity. David Miles of the Monetary Policy Committee has been stronger still. In a recent column on the case for higher equity he said:

“What are the people that run banks really saying if they argue that it is very costly – even unfeasible – to use more equity funding? One interpretation is that this argument is an admission that they cannot run a private enterprise in a way which makes people willing to provide finance whose returns share in the downside and the upside. In other words, they are not able to convince people who will face the full consequences of their commercial decisions to provide funding. It is as if banks cannot play by the same rules as other enterprises in a capitalist economy – after all, capitalists are supposed to use capital. You might expect that if this is the assessment of many people who currently run banks, then they would not wish to proclaim it so loudly.”

So at least some regulators recognise the issue. The problem is translating the conclusion into the arena of political negotiations in international fora, and the obsession with not disadvantaging ‘our’ banks. Politicians have not grasped that such support for ‘our’ banks comes at the cost of the welfare of ‘our’ citizens. I’d make The Bankers’ New Clothes required reading so that policy makers and regulators really appreciate why it is so perverse that the riskiest enterprises in modern capitalist economies are the ones with the least capital. The debate needs to be reset, away from the terms in which bankers talk about regulation, mystifying the rest of us.

As the authors conclude:

“We can have a financial system that works much better for the economy than the current system – without sacrificing anything. But achieving this requires that politicians and regulators focus on the public interest and carry out the necessary steps. The critical ingredient – still missing – is political will.”

[amazon_image id=”0691156840″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It[/amazon_image]

Naked bankers?

I started reading the proofs of a book due out in March, [amazon_link id=”0691156840″ target=”_blank” ]The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It [/amazon_link] by Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig. The title refers of course to the Hans Christian Anderson fairy tale, The Emperor’s New Clothes, in which the emperor is revealed to be naked by a seemingly naive question.

Just a few pages in to the introduction, I can tell I’m going to love it. Sample quotation:

“A major reason for the success of bank lobbying is that banking has a certain mystique. … Many of the claims made by leading bankers and banking experts actually have as much substance as the emperor’s new clothes in Andersen’s fairy story. But most people do not challenge these claims, and the claims have an impact on policy.”

And:

“Politicians seem to be taken in by the lobbying. For all the outrage that expressed about the crisis, they have done little to address the issues involved.”

Not just politicians – I refer to the Financial Times (print edition) headline earlier this week on the weakened liquidity rules accepted by the BIS: “Years of lobbying pay off for banks” (watered down subsequently online to ‘Basel bends on liquidity rules’).

More on the naked bankers when I review the book in due course.

[amazon_image id=”0691156840″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It[/amazon_image]