Globalisation and legitimacy

It has always been a bit depressing reading about trade negotiations, which have long been a battleground between competing interests – nation against nation, industry lobbies against the general interest, developing against rich world. Mutual gains from trade, anyone? The World Trade Organisation has been a particular focus of suspicion on the part of people who are anti-capitalism or anti-corporate. Most economists note that no country has ever developed out of poverty without opening up to trade, although of course views differ about how to do so, with some liking the idea of protecting certain industries.

I think these arguments are almost always wrong – the extremely rare potential exceptions involve very large economies of scale where the global market can only support a very few  competing firms (aerospace?) and culturally important goods or services where replacement of domestic by global goods could have adverse non-economic externalities (French movies?).

There are claims that the successful Asian economies only developed because they protected their new industries but this misreads the character of state intervention. Joe Studwell’s excellent book [amazon_link id=”1846682428″ target=”_blank” ]How Asia Works[/amazon_link] shows that the success stories in the region provided production subsidies and infrastructure but made very sure domestic ‘champions’ were exposed to the full blast of international competition.

[amazon_image id=”1846682428″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region[/amazon_image]

Still, the economic arguments don’t explain why it’s so hard to get a trade deal. In theory the WTO is a better forum than its predecessor, the GATT talks, because it is rules-based and puts every member on an equal footing. Yet there have always been suspicions about its legitimacy as a place where all countries get a fair deal. It is one element of the wider shortcomings of global economic governance. Jim O’Neill’s new book in the Perspectives series, The BRIC Road to Growth, calls for urgent reforms of the governance institutions. The ones we have can’t respond quickly to events, and don’t reflect the shift of economic gravity that has already occurred and will continue. These are linked: effectiveness is rooted in legitimacy. Whatever the outcome of the talks in Bali, the wider global governance problem just won’t go away.

[amazon_image id=”1907994130″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The BRIC Road to Growth (Perspectives)[/amazon_image]

Situation vacant: global hegemon

Serendipitously, I started reading this week a book that has been sitting in my office for a while, [amazon_link id=”069115743X” target=”_blank” ]The Leaderless Economy: Why the world economic system fell apart and how to fix it[/amazon_link] by Peter Temin and David Vines. Serendipitously because this follows on from just having read Jonathan Fenby’s excellent overview of China, [amazon_link id=”1847394116″ target=”_blank” ]Tiger Head, Snake Tails[/amazon_link], which has a big chunk on China’s global position, and also the forthcoming [amazon_link id=”1907994130″ target=”_blank” ]The BRIC Road to Growth[/amazon_link] by Jim O’Neill.

[amazon_image id=”069115743X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Leaderless Economy: Why the World Economic System Fell Apart and How to Fix It[/amazon_image]

All three raise the question of global economic governance. The word is unappealing, but it’s a vital issue. And Temin and Vines, a distinguished combo of economic historian and international economist, do a very interesting compare and contrast exercise between the 1930s and the present global economic crisis (I’m one of those who thinks it isn’t nearly over yet, despite signs of recovering growth). Others have of course drawn parallels with the 30s, but the focus here is on international governance – and also on the political consequences of an ailing global order. I knew I was going to like the book when the introductory chapter kicked off with David Hume’s price-specie flow mechanism. They write: “The price-specie flow model connects internal and external balances.” The two need to be considered together to find a solution to global disorder, they argue (Michael Pettis, in his excellent [amazon_link id=”0691158681″ target=”_blank” ]The Great Rebalancing[/amazon_link] would agree.) One thing that has changed since Hume’s time is the development of an asymmetric response between prices/wages and output/employment, but even so deflationary pressures are still evident in some countries.

The book characterises the current state of affairs as an ‘end of regime’ crisis, and argues that the resolution will depend on the emergence of a hegemonic country in the global economy, just as the 1930s crisis was not fully resolved until the US took that role. The ‘how to fix it’ of the subtitle is to have some leadership. “Continued neglect of international imbalances will lead to conditions reminiscent of the 1930s and possibly even to military conflicts like those of the 1940s,” they write. Scary thought. They note that it took decades for the switch from Britain to America to occur – from 1918 until the late 1940s really.

I suppose it is true that a single hegemon is necessary to orchestrate the co-operation needed to resolve the interaction of internal and external balances around the world. However, this is a depressing conclusion because my sense from my China reading (and I’m not at all an expert) is that the only candidate is far from ready to step into that role, while America’s decline is increasingly apparent with every news story about its bizarre, internally-obsessive politics – it can’t co-operate with itself, never mind other nations. Like Pettis, Temin and Vines see the economic solution as obvious – an expansion of domestic demand in China and Germany.

“The world …needs both co-operation and a way to make durable bargains among nations. … The absence of an obvious hegemonic leader makes it easy to be pessimistic that such co-operation will not be forthcoming.” Maybe, they suggest, the G20 could get its act together. Jim O’Neill’s [amazon_link id=”1907994130″ target=”_blank” ]The BRIC Road to Growth[/amazon_link] is a bit more optimistic about the scope for leadership to come from the fast-growing large emerging economies but also forsees governance change as likely to be too slow. Temin and Vines are pessimists: “Alas, politics in America and Europe seems to be aimed at repeating the mistakes of the 20th century in the first global crisis of the 21st.” A sobering thought as the 100th anniversary of World War I hoves into view.

I would make all political leaders read this book over the holidays – whether in December or a bit later for Chinese New Year – and hope that it prompts them to make a New Year resolution to show true leadership. A globalized world without global leadership is a pretty terrifying prospect.

Shipping news

I’m delighted to find that Rose George’s new book [amazon_link id=”1846272637″ target=”_blank” ]Deep Sea and Foreign Going: Inside Shipping, the Invisible Industry that Brings You 90% of Everything,[/amazon_link] is Book of the Week on Radio 4. Good for Maersk for allowing her to join the voyage. I’m looking forward to reading the whole book.

[amazon_image id=”1846272637″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Deep Sea and Foreign Going: Inside Shipping, the Invisible Industry That Brings You 90% of Everything[/amazon_image]

Regular readers of this blog will know of my mild obsession with shipping containers. Thanks to @illicit_econ on Twitter (well worth a follow) I’ve also found this documentary film essay, The Forgotten Space, by Allan Sekula and Noel Burch. I’m not sure how to get hold of this in a UK format but it looks enticing.

The shadow economy

The focus of economic policy is the economy that is counted; little attention is paid to the shadow economy. The reason is partly that it’s obviously hard to direct what’s unmeasured, and partly embarrassment about the very existence of shadow work – policy is supposed to aim at eliminating it. Yet of course it forms a substantial proportion of economic activity, in fact a minimum of around 10% of official GDP (the UK is at 12.5%) and more than half of official GDP in some (mainly poor) economies. Indeed it is so much more prevalent in the developing world that it shades into activity with a different name there, the informal economy.

The measurement of the shadow economy has been almost a one man activity. That man, Friedrich Schneider, has a new book or pamphlet out with co-author Colin Williams, published by the IEA, The Shadow Economy. It sets out his most recent estimates and surveys very usefully the drivers of shadow activity and the possible policies to reduce its size. This publication is a useful summary of Schneider’s longer works on the subject, such as [amazon_link id=”1107034841″ target=”_blank” ]The Shadow Economy: An International Survey.[/amazon_link] It’s good to be reminded about what we don’t have measures of, as well as what we do.

The Shadow Economy

The book, which is short, looks entirely at the legal shadow economy, which is to miss the criminal activities. That’s another story I suppose, the parallel globalization by organised crime, and one that Misha Glenny looks at in his books [amazon_link id=”0099481251″ target=”_blank” ]McMafia[/amazon_link] and [amazon_link id=”0099546558″ target=”_blank” ]Dark Market[/amazon_link].

[amazon_image id=”0099481251″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]McMafia: Seriously Organised Crime[/amazon_image]

Economists should take far more seriously this phenomenon. It impinges, with horrific results so often, on many people’s lives and is a part of 21st century globalization.

Schneider and Williams concentrate on labour market activities. Still, even with a relatively narrow focus, this is a very useful book for anybody interested in the issue.

Machines and foreigners

I’ve been reading in the area of overlap between labour market analysis, theory of the firm and trade theory. Well, to be strictly accurate, at the edges of those three areas of economics closest to each other, for their isn’t all that much overlap. David Autor comes closest in his recent work on inequality, technology and globalization. Richard Baldwin and others have come at it from the other side with their work on trade in tasks, bringing trade theory closer to theories of production. There’s more on the overlap between technology and the labour market of course. Standout books for me are Claudia Goldin and Ian Katz, [amazon_link id=”0674035305″ target=”_blank” ]The Race Between Education and Technology[/amazon_link], and Frank Levy and Richard Murnane, [amazon_link id=”0691124027″ target=”_blank” ]The New Division of Labour[/amazon_link].

[amazon_image id=”0674035305″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Race between Education and Technology[/amazon_image]

In addition there has been the whole recent ‘the robots are eating our jobs‘ riff – but I’m more convinced than ever that this is over-simplified. For one thing, you just can’t think properly about the robots without adding offshoring and trade into the mix. Just as a shift in the ease of trade is similar to an advance in technology in its economic effects, a big increase in the potential for using foreign workers for some functions is similar to using more technology.

I’ll be writing something up eventually and will post it when I do.