Cities triumphant and not so triumphant

One of the highlights for me of the European Economic Association/Econometric Society meetings (#eeaesem2013) that have just finished in Gothenburg was Ed Glaeser’s Marshall Lecture. All kinds of fascinating ideas were slotted into the one-hour lecture, whose theme was the interaction between the three pillars of urban economies: human interactions, engineering (the roads, buildings, cables etc), and public policy. The talk moved from the developed world to the developing world context, starting with a survey of the various kinds of evidence that population density drives productivity in cities but asking what ‘engineering’ and especially what public policy and institutional framework is necessary to enable the higher productivity and growth.

The evidence on growth happening in cities is strong, albeit with some inevitable questions about causality. For example, there is an earning premium for population density in US cities, and there has been faster house price growth in more densely populated cities. Prof Glaeser pointed out that older cities had formed because of a production advantage such as a good harbour but it is consumption advantages that matter now, as well as (in the US but not other countries) a nice climate. The people factor, the retention and increase in human capital, accounts for the contrast between the revival of Boston and New York since the 1970s and the continuing decline of Detroit and Cleveland. As an example of the importance of productivity arising from  face-to-face contact, he cited the way Mayor Bloomberg took the walls out of City Hall, so it looked like a trading floor: “Knowledge is more important than space.”

The human capital factor is even more important in helping explain which developing world cities are growing faster, along with the existence of an entrepreneurial industrial structure. We always think about the slums, but, as Prof Glaeser pointed out, poor people move to cities – it is not the cities that make them poor. Indeed, real incomes, taking account of the costs and disamenities of urban life, broadly equalize across urban and rural areas; in the 1970s people used to get ‘danger money’ to live in New York to compensate for the crime and grime. The mega-cities in Asia and Latin America and Africa are reaching much larger populations at given income levels than was historically the norm because agricultural productivity is higher than in the past and transportation costs lower. So it is much cheaper to get food into a large population than would previously have been the case. Hence today’s new cities are larger and fewer than the smaller and more widely dispersed cities in Europe.

Many people regard the growth of huge developing country cities, with sprawling slums and extreme poverty as an undesirable phenomenon – but the fact that the countries’ growth must be driven by cities makes this question of whether they are a good thing or not a rather meaningless question. The meaningful question is how can they be best run? For this, city governments need money, technology and governance to tackle what Prof Glaeser called the “demons of density”. He argued that it is too hard to determine the ‘optimal’ size of a city because there are many trade-offs. The final part of the lecture was a high-speed exposition of some models of some of these trade-offs, focusing on some of the institutional and political problems such as how law enforcement needs to change with city size and density – the costs of disorder increasing with city size, but the challenge of bringing order increasing too. Providing clean water is another vital challenge. So too is creating the framework for efficient land use – and the combination of business district skyscrapers and huge low-rise slums indicates that most developing world cities fail on this set of policies.

Many of us in the audience found the models sped past too quickly, and I’ll look forward to reading about them. Much of the contextual background can be found in Prof Glaeser’s terrific book, [amazon_link id=”0330458078″ target=”_blank” ]Triumph of the City[/amazon_link]. The bottom line of the lecture is that it is important to understand better the policy challenges and trade-offs in city politics, because all the vital national economic institutions are shaped in cities – the middle classes form there, revolutions start there, and, as Professor Glaeser noted, “There’s no such thing as an arch-libertarian in a city.” Economists need to understand better the nexus of urban policy and institutions, what it is that shapes the human interactions, the source of productivity and growth (or not).

[amazon_image id=”0330458078″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Triumph of the City[/amazon_image]

Municipal grandeur and balanced growth

One of the inspiring things about Tristram Hunt’s book [amazon_link id=”075381983X” target=”_blank” ]Building Jerusalem: The Rise and Fall of the Victorian City[/amazon_link] is reading about the energy and optimism of leading citizens in the newly industrialising cities.

[amazon_image id=”075381983X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Building Jerusalem: The Rise and Fall of the Victorian City[/amazon_image]

It was an era when Britain’s cities other than London, for all the misery and squalor of the working classes, had a sense of control over their own destiny. I do agree with Hunt when he says in the Introduction: “[T]he policies of successive British governments have served to castrate civic autonomy. Unintelligible and ideas-free history [of urban growth] has gone hand in hand with rate-capping, surcharging and centralisation to render local government and civic pride a forlorn part of the historical landscape.”

He points out that Lord Palmerston defended the grand designs for a new Foreign Office building in Whitehall on the basis that it could not be less impressive than Leeds Town Hall. The unpleasant John Ruskin criticised the ugliness of the northern cities – as apparently Peter Hall did too – but it would surely require mental blinkers not to appreciate the glory of Manchester Town Hall or St George’s Hall in Liverpool, or the streets of handsome warehouses in any of the Victorian industrial centres. Hunt writes: “Britain was a land of great cities, each one playing a part in the political process and preventing the unstable accumulation of too much power in the capital.” Commentators at the time contrasted Britain’s stability favourably with the continuing upheaval in over-centralised France.

It is a weakness of the British economy now that it runs on only one engine, albeit a super-sized one, in London. Nobody sensible wants to see London weakened, but surely everybody sensible would like to see other cities have the capacity to grow faster than they have for the past 50 years or more. When people talk about the desirability of rebalancing the economy so that manufacturing and exports grow faster than financial and other services, that’s equivalent to hoping for faster growth in the industrial centres outside the south east, because that’s where most of the manufacturing is located. Economies are not abstractions, they consist of people in places.

I was involved in the Manchester Independent Economic Review, looking at how the city could regain some of that Victorian dynamism, which requires regaining a stronger voice over some of the influences on growth, such as transport and other infrastructure links, planning (an area where the issues in south and north are entirely different), and skills.

It’s a slow process achieving these things, though. Not only is the centre naturally unwilling to cede any decision-making territory, there is also the tyranny of the so-called ‘postcode lottery’. Still, the experience of the devolved nations suggest it is possible to come to terms with difference, so I think it is worthwhile looking for inspiration in the Victorian cities.

Victoriana

The quantified (Victorian) life

The next of my holiday reads deserves a couple of posts. It was Tristram Hunt’s [amazon_link id=”075381983X” target=”_blank” ]Building Jerusalem: The Rise and Fall of the Victorian City[/amazon_link]. As someone who believes the UK economy is over-centralised around London, to the detriment of the whole economy including the capital, the era from the early 19th to early 20th centuries when many other major cities were growing rapidly is obviously intriguing. The UK stands out globally now for the extreme degree to which the economy depends on the capital – see for example the maps at the Geographically-based Economic Data website. France used to compete but there has been a significant devolution of both political power and economic growth (they go hand in hand of course) since the 1980s.

[amazon_image id=”075381983X” link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Building Jerusalem: The Rise and Fall of the Victorian City[/amazon_image]

Tomorrow’s post will discuss the economics. Today is for philosophy.

Hunt has a fascinating section about the intellectual currents of the 19th century, and in particular the romantic reaction against industrialisation and the growing dominance of what Thomas Carlyle described as the cash nexus. Carlyle wrote: “We call it a Society, and go about professing openly the totalest separation, isolation. Our life is not a mutual helpfulness; but rather, cloaked under due laws-of-war named “fair competition” and so forth, it is a mutual hostility. We have profoundly forgotten everywhere that Cash payment is not the sole relation of human beings.” He was one among many – prominent among the other anti-market, anti-economics intellectuals of the day was John Ruskin, whose [amazon_link id=”0140432116″ target=”_blank” ]Unto This Last[/amazon_link] is one of the books I love to hate. And this tradition continues today, the charge led by Michael Sandel’s [amazon_link id=”0241954487″ target=”_blank” ]What Money Can’t Buy.[/amazon_link]

I was interested to read in Hunt’s account that the Utilitarians, particularly Bentham, were held to blame for the spread of market (im)morality. That’s not too surprising – after all, the utilitarian calculus was about counting and calculating, as caricatured by Dickens in the person of Mr Gradgrind in [amazon_link id=”014143967X” target=”_blank” ]Hard Times[/amazon_link]. Sandel is no fan of utilitarianism either, whereas modern economics still rests in principle on the notion of ‘utility curves’.

There is, though, a paradox in the fact that today’s ‘well-being’ or ‘happiness’ economics, which makes much of the idea that money and markets should not be the sole drivers of public policy, is rooted in a version of utilitarianism. Here is Richard Layard in 2009 making this explicit:

“[E]very human being wants to be happy, and everybody counts equally. It follows that progress is measured by the overall scale of human happiness and misery. And the right action is the one that produces the greatest happiness in the world and (especially) the least misery.”

This is the utilitarian calculus, measured in quanta of happiness rather than money. For all that its advocates do not believe economic growth is the path to progress, the happiness approach would certainly fall foul of the belief of Carlyle and the other Romantics in the pre-eminence of emotions, institutions and tradition in society.

What is different, and what isn’t

I’ve been a bit mystified by Excel-gate (see this good, balanced summary by Gavyn Davies). Bravo for Thomas Herndon, the graduate student who uncovered the error in the now-notorious paper by Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff; his job prospects will be rightly enhanced by this episode.

But the glee with which anti-Austerians pounced on this episode to ‘prove’ that austerity doesn’t work seems to involve an assumption that the original Reinhardt-Rogoff paper of 2010 ‘proved’ anything to the contrary in the first place. There are lots of papers about the impact of debt/GDP ratios on growth, and they demonstrate all kinds of different things – see for example this BIS paper by Cecchetti and others, or this IMF paper (pdf) from last year on the Caribbean economies, or this Fed paper published in December (pdf), or this much-cited 2010 paper by Koehler-Geib and others, or for that matter the new paper debunking Reinhardt and Rogoff’s 90% as it too finds the same correlation albeit with different numbers.

Well, you get the idea. Taking these together, we ‘know’ there might be a threshold for sovereign debt, but it varies over time and across countries, it’s a correlation whose causal direction and mechanism is unclear, and there isn’t enough data for any estimates to be robust (because history only runs once). All of which only goes to underline how little is known about the macroeconomy, not to mention how hard any macroeconomists and their camp followers find it to resist claiming certainty where there is none.

No doubt Reinhardt and Rogoff were tempted into over-claiming for their work by the politicisation of the debt threshold issue. But the underlying message of their big 2009 book, [amazon_link id=”0691152640″ target=”_blank” ]This Time is Different[/amazon_link], is unscathed: unlike the later paper, it makes it absolutely clear that debt ‘thresholds’ above which increasing borrowing is correlated with lower growth vary widely in different countries and at different times (no magic 90% here); and that the historical record indicates it generally takes a long time for growth to recover after banking crises involving debt overhangs.

[amazon_image id=”0691152640″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly[/amazon_image]

Demography as destiny?

There was an intriguing short letter in the Financial Times this morning, urging that more attention be paid to the problem of a low birth rate and the adverse demography of an ageing society.  The writer evidently believes the welfare system should be encouraging people to have more children, rather than penalising them for large families. He cites a 1947 book, [amazon_link id=”B00195GT00″ target=”_blank” ]The Population of Britain[/amazon_link] by Eva Hubback.

[amazon_image id=”B00195GT00″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Population of Great Britain[/amazon_image]

Looking her up, Wikpipedia tells me Eva Hubback was a suffragist, head of economics at Newnham and Girton during the First World War, and advocate of birth control and eugenics. However, her book clearly advocates the national benefits of population growth. This is an intriguing combination of beliefs, very much of its time.

It has long seemed to me that economics doesn’t pay enough attention to demography. Obviously, people studying pensions and the fiscal implications do put the ageing trend at centre stage, and relative demographic trends crop up in work on international migration. But demography is surely fundamental for growth as well. One question is whether an older (on average) population will be as productive and innovative as a younger one. And if so, what does this imply for, say, predictions of Chinese economic power?

Another is simply the numbers game. Endogenous growth models imply that the growth rate is increasing in population, at an accelerating rate because of their increasing returns feature. Ideas live in people’s heads, and the combinatorial arithmetic makes more people generate many more ideas. This is something modern economists (although clearly not Eva Hubback) seem to gloss over with mild embarrassment.

The best book I’ve read including demography, although in a broader context than economic growth, was Emmanuel Todd’s 2001 [amazon_link id=”1845290585″ target=”_blank” ]After the Empire[/amazon_link]. He was looking ahead to the multipolar world. But I’d be interested to hear other recommendations.

[amazon_image id=”1845290585″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]After the Empire[/amazon_image]