Tag Archives: political economy

A blank slate on political economy

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A question: what would you put in a hypothetical brand new public policy/political economy course for undergraduates (mainly studying economics, mainly with a good maths A level)? What are the essential readings? Are there any examples of existing courses you would recommend?

My first thoughts – and this is very much off the top of my head – are: a bit of James Scott’s [amazon_link id=”0300078153″ target=”_blank” ]Seeing Like A State[/amazon_link]; [amazon_link id=”0141047976″ target=”_blank” ]23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism[/amazon_link], Ha-Joon Chang and/or Joe Studwell’s [amazon_link id=”1846682428″ target=”_blank” ]How Asia Works[/amazon_link] (reviewed here); definitely some Hume, always wise about the messiness of the world – maybe ‘Of A Particular Providence and A Future State’ from [amazon_link id=”002353110X” target=”_blank” ]An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding[/amazon_link]; Hirschman on possibilism (from [amazon_link id=”0691159904″ target=”_blank” ]The Essential Hirschman[/amazon_link] which I reviewed here yesterday);

[amazon_image id=”0300078153″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale Agrarian Studies)[/amazon_image]

[amazon_image id=”1846682428″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region[/amazon_image]

Case studies, from competition, immigration, education, energy policy, areas where economics and politics so often appear to conflict – it’s papers rather than books that come to mind, such as the excellent paper by Rufus Pollock on the liberalisation of directory enquiries. But also Daniel Bell in [amazon_link id=”0465097138″ target=”_blank” ]The Coming of Post Industrial Society[/amazon_link] on the conflict between technocratic decisions in a complex society and popular/populist democracy.

But there are many possibilities. Other suggestions?

Essays by the worldly philosopher

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[amazon_link id=”0691159904″ target=”_blank” ]The Essential Hirschman[/amazon_link] edited by his prize-winning biographer Jeremy Adelman ([amazon_link id=”0691155674″ target=”_blank” ]Worldly Philosopher)[/amazon_link] is a collection of essays well worth reading by anbody who, like me, was not very familiar with Hirschman’s work. The book is divided into three sections covering Hirschman’s work on development economics, essays on market societies, and essays on democracy including his thinking on political rhetoric.

[amazon_image id=”0691159904″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Essential Hirschman[/amazon_image]

I particularly like the combination of economic analysis (rarely expressed mathematically, but nonetheless rigorous) with an awareness of the difficulties of implementation, of political constraints, and of the role of the emotions in people’s decisions. For example, the first essay, ‘Political Economics and Possibilism’, looks specifically at the role of optimism and political leadership in bringing about change, and the scope for the same economic policies to have vastly different outcomes depending on political characteristics of the society in which they are introduced. For example, trade-offs that are possible in a relatively homogeneous society may not be feasible in one divided on religious or ethnic grounds, of might even lead to civil war. As Adelman puts it in his excellent introduction, “It is rare to find a writer in our times so at ease with the modern tools of the social scientist and yet so concerned with the complexity of the human condition that he or she can bring to life the frictions and tensions that come from looking at our world at the junctions of political, economic and emotional life.”

Hirschman, it is evident from this book and Adelman’s superb biography, Worldly Philosopher, was increasingly out of tune with the economics of his times. The subject became increasingly abstract and generalised, and inclined to require mathematical rigour everywhere. Hirschman was focused on the specifics of each situation. In ‘Search for Paradigms’, he argues that the highly analytical, paradigm-seeking frame of mind led either to undue conservatism about the prospects for things to improve, or its opposite, a revolutionary bias. In the essay on possibilism, he wrote: “Most social scientists conceive it as their exclusive task to discover and stress regularities, stable relationships and uniform sequences. This is obviously an essential search, one in which no thinking person can refrain from participating. But in social sciences there is a special room for the opposite type of endeavour: to underline the multiplicity and creative disorder of the human adventure, to bring out the uniqueness of a certain occurrence, and to perceive a new way of turning a historical corner.” And it is this last that makes him such an optimistic, encouraging thinker too.

I least enjoyed, however, a couple of the essays on development, which may well be because I am entirely unfamiliar with his theory of linkages – these essays didn’t mean much to me out of context. Still, even in those, the emphasis on tensions and conflicts as motors of change, and the inevitable messiness of the process, is clear.

The book also has a nice evaluation of Hirschman by Emma Rothschild and Amartya Sen as an afterword. They say his work cannot be neatly mapped onto any of the normal distinctions we tend to make, between orthodox and heterodox, between theoretical and empirical, between state and market – “he aspired to both and embraced the conflict between them,” they conclude. It is well worth reading some of Hirschman’s classic books such as [amazon_link id=”0674276604″ target=”_blank” ]Exit, Voice and Loyalty[/amazon_link] of course, but this book of essays is a terrific overview of his work.

 

Integration of the social sciences

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Yesterday I quoted the 1827 UCL prospectus definition of economics, with its emphasis on “accurate observation and precise language,” and capsule definition of ‘the science of political economy’ as, “the production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the outward things obtained by labour, and needed or desired by man.”

I was mulling over the difference between this and Lionel Robbins’ famous 1932 definition of economics (in [amazon_link id=”B002ZZ0U8A” target=”_blank” ]An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science[/amazon_link]): “The science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” The greater abstraction compared with the ‘political economy’ of a century earlier is all too apparent.

In his 1948 Newmarch Lectures, [amazon_link id=”1107673860″ target=”_blank” ]The Role of Measurement in Economics[/amazon_link], Richard Stone added this gloss to the Robbins definition:

“While many situations in actual life have an economic aspect, few if any can be analysed wholly in economic terms. Taken literally, however, it would bring the applied economist practically to a full stop since he cannot in general estimate the importance of economic factors unless he is prepared to make assumptions about…certain non-economic factors, such as changes in tastes. In fact he can frequently do this for himself in a rough and ready way, although undoubtedly it would be a gain if he could fall back on other branches of the social sciences for help in such matters. The moral of Robbins’ definition is that in applied work much more integration of the social sciences is needed.”

Hear, hear!

Future democracy

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Later today I’m speaking at Nesta’s FutureFest about future economic institutions, in what looks to be a terrific session, compered by Mark Stevenson, author of the excellent [amazon_link id=”1846683572″ target=”_blank” ]An Optimist’s Tour of the Future[/amazon_link]. Yesterday I popped in and heard Cambridge political scientist David Runciman give a thought-provoking talk on the future of democracy. I heard him speak on democracy in the 2011 Princeton University Press lecture, and his book [amazon_link id=”0691148686″ target=”_blank” ]The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy from World War I to the Present[/amazon_link] is out soon.

[amazon_image id=”0691148686″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Confidence Trap: A History of Democracy in Crisis from World War I to the Present[/amazon_image]

The quick summary (based on my tweets of a 15 minute talk) is that political institutions have not kept pace with technological change – indeed, they’ve hardly moved at all in the 25 years of dramatic advance in information and communications technologies. (Indeed, the mismatch between the pace of technological and social change is a commonplace.) However, he continued by saying that technology has in fact become the way political change has happened, to the extent it has. This manifests itself as technocracy – either the Chinese type, run by engineers, or the western type, run by economists and financiers. Technocracy is unsustainable, however. Democracy needs a reboot, by changing its scale of application, to the city level and to the supra-national, continental level.

It sounds intriguing enough to make the book a wanna-read.

David Runciman at FutureFest

 

Economists, doctors and quacks

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The news of the death of Ronald Coase sent me to his key papers, of course (all listed here), but also to a collection of essays I hadn’t read before, [amazon_link id=”0226111032″ target=”_blank” ]Essays on Economics and Economists[/amazon_link]. He makes some very interesting points about the role of economics in public policy, expanding on the question of how limited government intervention to correct market failures ought to be. Essentially, Coase argued that this is an empirical question. The existence of significant transactions costs means market arrangements can lead to inefficient outcomes, but government interventions are often flawed too. He approves of George Stigler’s work on the political ‘market’, with the firms affected by regulations likely to be the highest ‘bidders’, therefore able to shape regulation in their own interests. (If this seems cynical, think about banking regulation.)

[amazon_image id=”0226111032″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]Essays on Economics and Economists[/amazon_image]

In ‘Economists and Public Policy’, Coase turns to economists: “The problem is that economists seem willing to give advice on questions about which we know very little and on which our judgements are likely to be fallible, while what we have to say that is important and true is quite simple – so simple that little or no economics is required to understand it.” However, the simple truths are highly unwelcome. The essay goes on to discuss the political and popular resistance to economic arguments against, say, price controls after a bad harvest. “History indicates that these are simple truths which people find it easy to reject or ignore.” The essay is not entirely pessimistic – Coase believed that when the counter-productive effects of policies became too large, the policies would be reversed.

Coase is also trenchant on the character of economics. It is clear he disapproved of the ‘imperialism’ of economics, the Chicago-originated move into subject areas such as family life, previously the terrain of other social sciences. He cannot have been a fan of [amazon_link id=”0141019018″ target=”_blank” ]Freakonomics[/amazon_link]. However, he is pretty scathing, in the essay ‘Economics and Contiguous Disciplines’, about the failure of other social sciences to raise their game in their techniques and attention to evidence – he sees as particular strengths of economics the recognition of general equilibrium effects (everything is connected) and the relevance of economic incentives in other decisions, too often simply denied by other social scientists. Finally, the essay argues that economists need to study contiguous social sciences, “because it is necessary if they are to understand the working of the economic system itself.” He concluded: “We may expect the scope of economics to be permanently enlarged to include studies in other social sciences. But the purpose will be to enable us to understand better the working of the economic system.” His own work, of course, laid the foundations for institutional economics.

There are a couple of interesting essays on Marshall in the book too. Coase likes Marshall’s insistence on the need for both theory and evidence, deductive and inductive reasoning in economics. He obviously found modern economics far too much on the theoretical, deductive (or reductive) side.

I also happened to read this weekend Jamie Whyte’s pamphlet for the Institute of Economic Affairs, [amazon_link id=”0255366736″ target=”_blank” ]Quack Policy: Abusing Science in the Cause of Paternalism[/amazon_link]. There was a brief to-do online about this, with critics noting that it was hardly surprising the free-market IEA had published a pamphlet arguing against government interventions, and how could anyone argue against evidence-based policy? Whyte wrote some years ago an excellent and funny book, [amazon_link id=”0954325532″ target=”_blank” ]Bad Thoughts: A Guide to Clear Thinking[/amazon_link], about the absence of logic and sense in much public debate. The pamphlet looks at several different areas of policy and asks about the standards of evidence underpinning them. It’s obvious where it’s coming from, but it makes a number of sound points.

[amazon_image id=”0255366736″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]QUACK SCIENCE & PUBLIC POLICY[/amazon_image]

The first two examples are health-related: proposals for minimum alcohol pricing and the ban on ‘passive’ smoking. Any health-related subjects are awash with political correctness and the abuse of statistics; medical people are strongly resistant to the relevance of any economic considerations at all, which one might take more seriously if they were more statistically-adept. In these two chapters Whyte argues that:

(a) a cost-benefit analysis must take account of the costs of outlawing something, and this is rarely done in health matters – NICE guidelines seemingly explicitly rule out consumer welfare considerations (p35);

(b) the incremental risks of the target behaviour are such that these costs can be very small (although he seems to me to underestimate them in the alcohol example); and

(c) the policies ought not to be economically perverse.

Actually, I think he misses the strongest case against a minimum alcohol price, which is that it increases the profits of big retailers by enforcing the kind of retail price maintenance long outlawed by competition authorities. If the government decides alcohol should be dearer, it should raise the rate of duty. This would not, however, be so pleasing to the sellers of alcohol as taxpayers would then benefit, not retailers – see Coase’s essay, above.

Whyte has a chapter on global warming that goes through the debate about how much we should weigh future against current welfare, including the likelihood that future generations will be richer, and that technological progress will occur, in trying to calculate the costs and benefits of action against global warming. (I think he’s sceptical about whether it’s occurring but that isn’t the main point here.) This is the same debate that occurred among economists like Partha Dasgupta, William Nordhaus and Nick Stern when the [amazon_link id=”0521700809″ target=”_blank” ]Stern Review[/amazon_link] was published. It’s a perfectly respectable argument to set out. Then he turns to what he describes as ‘happiness engineering’, where my sympathies are with him entirely. Government attempts to make people ‘happier’ are either obvious – ensure there are plenty of jobs, keep inflation modest – or intrusively paternalistic.

There’s a final chapter, which is too cursory, about the problem of using ‘scientific authority’ as the basis for public policy. “Experts are natural supporters of policies that draw on their expertise and thus naturally inclined to overstate the credibility and importance of their ideas,” he writes. Of course. But is not using expertise really better? Of course we would like policy to be genuinely evidence-based, and it is difficult to assess the epistemological status of proclaimed expertise. However, Coase’s pragmatism is more attractive than Whyte’s all-out scepticism, for all that Quack Policy flags up some good reasons for concern about how ‘evidence’ is used in actual policy-making.

This was a theme of another book I read recently, [amazon_link id=”0815793898″ target=”_blank” ]Government Failure versus Market Failure[/amazon_link] by Clifford Winston, which in this post I compared and contrasted with Hirschman’s writing on [amazon_link id=”067476868X” target=”_blank” ]The Rhetoric of Reaction[/amazon_link]. How you devise and implement welfare-enhancing, effective government policies in complex societies with a wide range of interests bearing on politicians – it’s what we’re all about as economists (and other social scientists).

A new book reviewed by Peter Wilby in The Guardian this weekend looks highly relevant too: [amazon_link id=”1780742665″ target=”_blank” ]The Blunders of Our Governments[/amazon_link] by Anthony King and Ivor Crewe.

[amazon_image id=”1780742665″ link=”true” target=”_blank” size=”medium” ]The Blunders of Our Governments[/amazon_image]

I’m sceptical about a lot of government interventions and also sceptical about leaving everything to the mythical market; it seems the only evidence-based possibility. We should demonstrate due humility by avoiding overclaiming either way.