A batch of books

A clutch of books to report on. Why Trust Matters: An economist’s guide to the ties that bind us by Benjamin Ho is a nice synoptic view of the economics of trust/social capital. One point that particularly struck me was the link between trust and patience: “co-operative behavior is easier to maintain when people value the future more – which is just another way of saying that they are more patient.” Perhaps it should be obvious but I hadn’t made the link. I also like the idea of a sort of Goldilocks level of the strength of contracts: not too weak or it becomes to risky to engage in the economic relationship; but also not too strong because trust can’t grow if there’s no opportunity to demonstrate trustworthiness. After all, trust is only needed because there is risk. This would be a nice book to introduce students to a wide literature on trust, social capital, game theory and contracting under uncertainty and asymmetric information. It braids bits of the literature together with a light touch.

Causal Inference: The Mixtape by Scott Cunningham is an excellent text book. It joins both the Angrist and Pischke duo of books (Mostly Harmless Econometrics and Mastering Metrics) and Judea Pearl’s Book of Why in the recent mini-wave of excellent introductions to causal inference. ‘Mixtape’ has as much statistical theory as you need and also includes both Stata and R code for student exercises.

And an utterly brilliant non-econ book I just read is Karl Deisseroth’s Connections: A Story of Human Feeling. He is both a neuroscientist running a lab at Stanford, famous for inventing optogenetics (no, me neither) and a practising psychiatrist. The book moves between the scientific insights and the human stories, showing how they illuminate each other. It’s also beautifully written. One of my books of 2021 so far.

 

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Populism, technocracy and politics

It’s possible to feel gloomy about the prospects for democracy, even with Joe Biden safely in the White House and a few regional or local elections that have gone against the extreme right, in Germany and France. The current UK government, for example, gives rather alarmingly frequent Trumpist signs of wanting to tear down some of the protections for the institutions of democracy (IDs to vote when there is next to no voter fraud, rigging public appointments, attacking independent institutions). So Jan-Werner Müller’s Democracy Rules is timely. As he puts it: “Farage did not bring Brexit about all by himself: he needed his Michael Gove… and his Boris Johnson.” Populism is an elitist game; on both sides of the Atlantic established conservative elites are at the heart of the trend. It is also anti-democratic, including in defining some groups (immigrants, asylum seekers, minorities) as outsiders by their nature.

The first chapter sets the scene by diagnosing recent political trends. The middle section of the book discusses the necessary conditions for democracy. One thing that very much struck me is that uncertainty is inherent in democracy. “On a very basic level democracy makes no sense without the possibility of people at least sometimes changing their minds.” Identity, of any kind, “is not political destiny.” Opinion polls do not reveal eternal truths. Politics is not a matter of fixing problems. “The point is that claims about conflicts in a society can be presented in different ways and there is a creative element in how major political choices are put together and offered to voters.” The institutions of democracy need to embed uncertainty – and so, for example, Müller argues that the domain of algorithmic decision making in policy needs to be curtailed.

This section ends with an interesting discussion of the relationship between technocracy and populism: techno-populism. The argument is that the will of the ‘ordinary’ person is proclaimed while at the same time technocrats are charged with implementing the ‘will of the people’ in the interests of the common good – Italy’s 5 Star movement is the example. “Technocracy and populism are both anti-pluralist or even anti-political, if one takes politics to mean that the solutions are never just given by either expertise or the fiction of a uniform popular will.”

The book ends by emphasizing the importance of intermediary institutions: parties and the media – which are of course the targets populists go for, parasitically hollowing out their host party, gerrymandering, attacking electoral watchdogs, undermining independent journalism. There is a coda offering reasons for “hope but not optimism.” As with some other excellent recent books about the assault on democracy (eg this or this), I ended up feeling rather glum, but agreed very much with the closing shot: democracy is not about hope but rather about effort.

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Philosophy for humans (and Humeans)

I’ve thoroughly enjoyed Julian Baggini’s The Great Guide: What David Hume Can Teach Us about Being Human and Living Well. It took me back in a Proustian way to the late 1970s, when I was reading Hume in my PPE course and struggling with the ideas-impressions discussion while relishing his essay on the price-specie flow mechanism. But then I was always much better at the E than either of the Ps. And despite my struggles with philosophy, I’ve always been a Hume fan. The pragmatism, empiricism, moderation all appealed. Of course, Hume like so many of our forebears held views we see as unacceptable – the book discusses them in an early chapter. But I hold to my generally high opinion of him, feeling we could share a motto: Well, it’s a bit more complicated than that.

The Great Guide takes a chronological approach through Hume’s life, using the pleasing device of visiting the places he lived and including photos by the author. The key ideas are pegged to different chapters as Hume published his books and essays. There’s an excellent discussion of induction, and the role of experience as opposed to a priori reasoning in understanding causality. As Baggini summarises, it logic is algorithmic but, “There is no algorithm for good reaosning.” There is also an interesting section on the social character of reasoning: reasoning needs not to be something that inheres in us as individuals. “Although there is a sense in which we have to be the ultimate judge of what seems most rational to us, in order to reach such a judgement we have to argue with others and hear conrtdictory viewpoints.”

I also liked the discussion of Hume’s idea of personal identity as an aggregate of feelings, perceptions, ideas etc, which Baggini tells me is close to the Buddhist concept of anatta. And thoroughly agree with him that, “Hume shows us that the best writing combines rigor of thought with clarity of expression, difficulty of substance with ease of style.”

Maxims like these are dotted through the book and collected at the end, to live up to the promise of the subtitle. They reinforce Hume’s position as my favourite philosopher.

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Pre-postliberal zombies

This week’s read has been Adrian Pabst’s Postliberal Politics, with the cheery subtitle The Coming Era of Renewal. It’s hard to believe the past 18 months, on top of the post-2008 real wage stagnation, and the Brexit/Red Wall voting phenomena that there will not be some kind of realignment? This book advocates for a community-centric economic and political model, focusing on family, dignity and local identity. It’s an appealing vision, in the same vein as some other recent books by economists (Mark Carney, Minouche Shafik, Raghuram Rajan, Sam Bowles) but with a focus on the politics rather than the economic policies. I’m suppose I’m enough of an old-fashioned (pre-post) liberal that the communitarian flavour makes me a bit uncomfortable, as does the religious thread, while agreeing intellectually that excessive individualism has been highly problematic.

The book is short (and wonderfully jargon-free) so it doesn’t bother with the always-unsatisfactory bullet point lists about what are the top 10 policies needed to get from here to that future political renewal. Indeed, it concludes: “Building  a new consensus requires more than a political and policy programme. It has to be anchored in a public philosophy to outflank both technocracy and ideological extremes. A public philosophy expresses the shared ends of political action.” Quite. The public philosophy guiding policy and politics since the late 1970s has crumbled yet lives on in zombie form in many arenas of policy-making. This is a thought-provoking building block in an alternative that might take some time to rise out of the rubble. An interesting read.

51O6nU3jpRL._SX317_BO1,204,203,200_Speaking of outmoded public philosophies, I also polished off Qiu Xiaolong’s Hold Your Breath China. This series of detective novels isn’t all that well-written; I like them mainly for the flavour of Shanghai life. However, the culprit in this one, whose plot concerns air pollution is clear: GDP. Who would have expected the flaws of GDP to be the central issue in a crime novel?

Spreading the thriving

Jan Eeckhout’s The Profit Paradox: how thriving firms threaten the future of work is a very good read. It’s a game of two halves (yes, someone in my household is permanently watching the football at the moment).

The first half (in fact parts 1 and 2) is a nice synopsis of the reasons the economy (mainly the US but others are covered) tend towards a) concentration across many markets and hence b) diverging fortunes of companies and their employees, and the places where people live. This covers the features of digital technology, superstar phenomena, agglomeration economies – these are familiar to anyone who has been keeping up with the literature, but I applaud how well the book is written. Hooray for an economist who can write so engagingly. This section documents the evidence on concentration and mark-ups, the growing divergence between companies in terms of productivity and profits, and the corresponding decline in the labour share as outsourcing of routine occupations (call centres, cleaners, admin) has progressed. Eeckhout argues that there is assortative matching such that pay and conditions are polarising between people with high value jobs in frontier firms and people with low value added jobs in their contractors.

The book’s focus is on the implications of market power for people as workers, rather than as consumers – although it also notes the excess pricing power too. In sum, it reduces wages, both directly through monopsony power in individual labour markets and also because of the the macroeconomic consequences: with so many people in contingent work with low pay, aggregate demand is inadequate. (Some) firms are doing well but the economy isn’t. And this is the heart of Eeckhout’s argument: “The effect of the tide of market power is lowering wages across the economy.” I find this link persuasive. While there are many economists looking at the elements of this story, the way they are combined here is enlightening.

The second half turns to the much harder question of what to do, starting with an affirmation that for all the disruption the new technologies are a good thing (this chunk reminded me a bit of my own Paradoxes of Prosperity, which first came out in September 2001 and not surprisingly was hardly noticed).

The recommendations boil down to: enforce labour standards; mandate more data openness; and beef up anti-trust policies. In particular (under the last heading) stop big tech making more acquisitions, regulate them rather than break them up (so as not to lose beneficial network economies), and assess market impacts in the round rather than firm by firm. (Tricky to implement but I do remember that in my days on the Competition Commission, as it then was, we often had to include a section of the report on ‘Features of the market’ – problems in concentrated markets do often spread beyond an individual transaction).

I’d agree with all these suggestions in the book but they add up to a meta-suggestion: find the political will to change the institutional architecture so that it delivers fairer outcomes. The technological tides won’t retreat but the effects depend on what institutions confront them. Is Lina Khan’s appointment in the US a sign of lasting change?

 

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